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FOREWORD
Immediately after the Philippine economy plunged into a deep
balance of payments crisis in 1983, a good number of analyses were
offered by experts on the reasons that led to the crisis. Few, how-
ever, offered as perceptive an analysis as Dr. Gerardo P. Sicat, former
Minister of Economic Planning and Director-General of the National
Economic and Development Authority, did during an address he
delivered before the 21st Annual Meeting of the Philippine Economic
Society (PES)in December 1984.
While Dr. Sicat's speech was sufficiently covered by the business
media and included as part of the printed proceedings of the Philip-
pine Economic Society in the first quarter 1985 issue oi: the Phi/ip-
pine Economic Journal, it is believed that this piece rightly deserves
to be published as a "solo" document and included in the mainstream
of Philippine economic literature. Hence, almost one-and-a-half years
after it was first delivered, Dr. Sicat's address is being reprinted under
the PIDS Monograph Series. The piece remains today as timely and
significant as when it was first heard and read.
We hope that many of the insights and recommendations in-
cluded in this piece will not be overlooked in the new agenda for our
national economic recovery program.
FILOLOGO PANTE, J R.
President
ABSTRACT
The ar.ticle analyzes the problems confronting the Philippine
economy and offers an explanation of the reasons and events that led
to the current economic crisis in the Philippines. After the author
makes the necessary discounts for national political events and time
role played by the international economy and other external factors,
he focuses on the role played by the market mechanism in the his-
tory of the Philippine economy.
Much of the problems, according to the author, resulted from a
cumulation of situations in which interventions in the market system
made the economy less efficient. Deviations from the price mecha-
nism as the prime element of solving essentially market problems
aggravated national problems rather than lessened them. The author
contends that the most glaring of these deviations was the unrealistic
exchange rate policy adopted by government through the years. Con-
sequently, with tile worsening of some problems, the ability of time
government to cope with other more basic duties was adversely af-
fected.
Sicat cites two major components for recovery in the future:
(a) restoration of credit lines and foreign exchange inflows through
the sheer economics of readjustment; and (b) restoration of con-
fidence in the Philippine economy. The latter is not only economic;
it is essentially governed by political factors.
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A HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVE OF
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Gerardo P. Sicat*
Introduction
I am glad to be with the Philippine Economic Society especially
at this 21st annual meeting when the principal topic is the Updated
Philippine Development Plan. The Development Plan, a]ways_ an
exciting subject of discussion, is a document of potentially great
significance to the nation's future.
I know not only from experience but also from conviction be-
fore, during, and after service in government that the Development
Plan is hardly finished after the draft document had gone through
the process of debate, approval, and printing.
The prepared document is only the framework utilized by
government, it is used to attain, with limited resources, the country's
economic aspirations. What the government and its instrumentalities
do with the spirit and content of the plan signifies the real meaning
of the implementation process. It also reveals the political will of the
nation, as expressed by its leaders, in relation to its concept of plan-
ning.
Since the advent of the economic crisis, there has been a surfeit
of explanations about what went wrong with the economy. It is fair
game for every one to contribute his own analysis. For, if one has
been hurt by an event or a condition, there must be some explana-
*Head, Public Policy Economics Division, World Bank. Former Professorof
Economics and Regent, University of the Philippines, Minister of Economic
Planning and Director-General of the National Economic and Development
Authority and Chairman, Philippine National Bank; president of the Philippine
Economic Society in ] 967-]968 and editor of the Philippine Economic Journal
from 1965 to 1974. Address before the 21st Annual Meeting of the Philippine
Economic Society (PES), December 8, ]984, at the Philippine International
Convention Center, Manila. The article also appearedin the.Philippine Economic
Journal, First Quarter ] 985, as part of the proceedingsof that meeting.
I
tion which can be derived, either by introspection or from personal
experience, for instance, from a logical study of the Philippine expe-
rience. In fact, the 'field of expertise respond[ng to this question of
Why the cr/s/s? has enlarged somewhat by a geometric factor. Expert
opinions, whether solicited or not, whether of the street or the desk-
top variet_y, are now too many. Sometimes, though, it is not neces-
sarily true that good explanation drives out the bad. Some spurious
explanations gain currency-because, through laziness and lack of
rigor, they are easier to understand. Hence, if the hypotheses explain-
ing our malaise have multiplied, it is .not necessarily the case that we
have attained wisdom thereby.
One school of thought, not uncommon in some business, poli-
tical, and other disgruntled sectors, follows the strain that the fault
lies in :'subservience of the government to policies dictated from
outside." The diatribe about the evils of policies of external institu-
tions and their being against Philippine interests then follows. The
premise is therefore the conclusion, no matter how much embel-
lished the matter is. Articulate laymen, including businessmen, law-
yers, and engineers, as well as members of the so-called parliament of
the streets, have echoed this reasoning.
This simplistic view is the equivalent of the argument, often
stated unabashedly by government apologists, that the problems of
the present crisis are the result of external economic forces beyond
the control of policymakers and government. Naturally, a sensible,
more independent-minded person would have to reiect both explana-
tions.
It is easy to find a scapegoat. But even this does not do away
with the problem. It only leads to wrong conclusions and, therefore,
to wrong policy recommendations.
There are of course some studies that have become reference
points. Of these, the Task Force report of some professors at the
School of Economics at the University of the Philippines has become
a major document. This is a well-deserved status. The thoroughness
of its coverage and the depth of the effort at quantifying its claims
has opened some interesting propositions that would in the future be
debated. Some of the claims it makes are undoubtedly controversial.
This work has done the service of highlighting some of the important
issues. This is why this document has become a definitive point of
attack by those who detect different ghosts as lurking behind the
economic crisis.
I have essentially kept quiet during this period. The only time I
was drawn out was when, at the invitation of the Society, I was
asked, to be a discussant o'f the task force analysis emanating from
the School o'f Economics. Of course, not being the principal, I com-
mented only on aspects of it.
Today, I think it my duty to offer an analysis of the problems
confronting us. To begin with, this is as good a time as any for me to
speak as freely as I can from a personal viewpoint. In order to flush
out the problems, i will take a critical view. Probably, it is the kind
of role that is e_xpected of rne. When I joined government, there were
many things that did not satisfy me. When I left it, I had a feeling
that something was partly accomplished but that there were serious
drawbacks. So I left government feeling just as dissatisfied as when I
came. I think this is a healthy attitude. Or else, one could become an
unbearable apologist. Many of my former close co-workers in govern-
ment will recognize the views and comments to be made shortly. So,
one can at least say that I am true to my views.
Originally, I had wanted to give a more exhaustive historical
insight into our present economic problems. After giving that a little
try, it appeared that to give that topic the justice it deserves would
need another occasion. It is therefore more a_propriate to cite
instances of recent history wherein the policies were not set correctly
or when departure from superior policies was made.
This presentation allows us to put in perspective the reasons for
the draconian economic policy restraints now being imposed to
restore economic adjustment or recovery. It shows why the medicine
is much more bitter than it would havebeen at much earlier periods
when the measures appeared most sensible to tak_ and why, predict-
ably, one also cannot expect much progress in the next three to five
years even if we are atoning now for the "sins of the past."
Indeed, the next few years will be very difficult years for the
economy. No one should be deluded into thinking that the IMF loan
and the restructuring of the external debt with the country's creditor
banks and countries will give any quick order of recovery in the
future. There are essential!y two components: one is the hard busi-
ness of restoring credit lines and foreign exchange inflows through
the sheer economics of ra_adjustment.
The other relates to the "confidence game." This 'is not only
economic. In today's context and tomorrow's (meaning, the next
few years), it is essentially governed by political factors. Any news
and pictures about large demonstrations in Martila and NPA en-
counters in the South shake up the confidence of some decision-
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makers about our foreign credits. Any speculation about the presi-
dent's health calls to mind the present uncertainty, until 1987 at
least, of the succession game.
At such times, the telephone wires keep burning and it would
seem at least that PLDT is making good international business. It is a
fact of life in our nation today that political confidence comes as an
important issue. It displaces even the essential economic issues that
we would have to squarely face later. Basically, therefore, we are
facing new realities, and our political institutions are under test.
Let me begin first to assign a weight to a political event that has
affected our country enormously last year. The assassination of
Senator Aquino has done an enormous damage of setting back a large
part of the timetable of development in the 'nation. This event alone
scored neatly in undermining the credibility before the world of the
present government, whether deserved or not. It took away the con-
fidence that was already shaky at that point and made it a large event
of consequential dimensions, thus aggravating a crisis that was al-
ready rearing its head.
As long as appropriate discounts for political events are made, we
might as well also assign the due weight to the role played by the
international economy , to new protectionism from industrial coun-
tries, to the oil shocks, and to international economic recession. All
these factors influenced the constriction of Philippine economic op-
tions and, as a consequence, performance. But, as the many have
asked, how come some countries, including at least one in the
ASEAN region, have performed relatively well? They faced relatively
the same influences and they also had suffered as much from the oil
shocks.
Philippine Economic Malaise
The present economic crisis is a manifestation of the seriousness
of the Philippine economic malaise. What is this malaise? The cumu-
lation of economic and other factors that contributed to the crisis is
like a convergence of the many tributaries and streams into a mighty
river. A review of a common trait that can be traced to economic fac-
tors will show that, in many instances, the problems that arise are the
result of a cumulation of situations in which interventions in the
market system made the economy less efficient. Deviations from the
price mechanism as the prime element of solving essentiaily market
problems have aggravated national problems rather than lessened
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them. With the worsening of some problems, the ability of the
government to cope with other more basic duties was also affected
adversely.
In one sense, the resulting situation deviated from the actual
direction of promotion of free private enterprise. The existence of
too many regulations and controls has distorted an essentially private
enterprise economic system with too many hindrances to private
initiative by impeding the exercise of initiative.
Economic crises have not been an uncommon phenomenon since
independence. These crises were often signaled by large balance of
payments deficits. The balance of payments position served as a
gauge of the health of the economy. It reflected on the nature of
domestic economic balance vis-a-vis the international picture. The
influences operating on an open economy would somehow eventu-
ally give way if pressures were continually exerted on prices or on
imports.
Persistent balance of payments deficits indicated that, some-
where in the economy, imports kept exceeding the earnings from
exports, and that insufficient voluntary capital inflows could be
found to finance these deficits. A chronic problem existed when
these deficits occur recurrently. Therefore the analysis of the malaise
must first take a look at those factors that have caused the persistent
deficits.
Now, any sensible economist (or doctor) would recognize that
the symptom is only a clue to the possible disease. There are other
more important reasons. Like any good mechanic trying to analyze
the reasons why a car fails to optimize performance on the basis of
the manufacturer's claims, it would be essential to look at those
factors that are responsible for the economy's below par perform-
ance. As in many things, one could look at this problem 'from any
particular angle.
A Keynesian schooled in the absorption approach would look
into the levels of aggregate spending and determine how much of
that aggregate spending should be curtailed to restore economic baF
ance. To some extent, this is the model that has underlied IMF-
dominated adjustment policies which many developing countries cri-
ticize. By their nature, these measures are short-term and quite cut-
ting in their impact on the economy.
A structuralist would look for the real factors that lurk behind
the balance of payments deficits. This would require an analysis of
the internal structure of the economy, pinpointing certain structural
difficulties which make economic progress difficult. Structural
problems of the economy require a long-term adjustment solution.
By and large, the World Bank has of late been associated with the
structuralist school of thought.
Someone who believes in the "dependency" theory would look
into the power relations between countries, especially between rich
and poor countries. This viewpoint is much in vogue especially
among non-economists who find the explanations of economic theory
sometimes too abstruse. In fact, however, much of the dependency
theory is devoid of economic theory; it derives its strength from
historical and psychological relations of power. This probably ex-
plains the ease with which others, notably non-economists and those
whose training in economics is only on the fringe, absorb this expla-
nation quickly. It is an easy explanation like that describing imperia-
list-dependent country relations.
It is possible to weave oneself into any of these theoretical con-
structs and explain the Philippine economic malaise from their
respective viewpoint. But avoiding all these, there is a much simpler
route, which has the most powerful explanation for the cumulation
of problems that the economy has encountered. This is the rol_ of
the market mechanism.
The market mechanism can play a most constructive role in
relieving government and policymakers of cumbersome problems.
Many allocation problems get solved in an impersonal way. Provided
efforts are made to see to it that a competitive solution is being
arrived at, many of the intractable problems of economic develop-
ment can be solved. Very often, the distrust of the so-called market
solution is not really a distrust but a feeling born out of ignorance.
Some policymakers are afraid that the market solution is the one
made by monopolists using their monopoly power over powerless
people. If monopoly is the problem, the market solution should
promote conditions of greater competition. Sometimes, however, the
greater mistake is to attempt to dismantle an otherwise competitive
setup, installing a public monopoly whic_h, in turn, becomes the
source of market oppression and scarcities. In a market setup in
which competitive forces are in operation, as any economist knows,
excessive profits are erased, and more goods become available in the
,market at relatively cheaper prices.
The message of the market was Lost along the way in the develop-
ment economics of the last 40 years because of the alleged excessive
preoccupation with "planning." Yet, as W. Arthur Lewis and other
distinguished economists would remind us, there could beplanning
with the help of the market. The market simplifies large problems. In
fact, the message of the market, as a prime allocator, is found in the
success stories of many countries in the Asian region. These countries
are led by Japan and now by the so-called NICs or newly indus-
trializing countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singa-
pore.
In the Philippine case, there have been times when shifts toward
better pricing policies occurred. Over time, decision-makers reverted
to policies that contrived situations out of a competitive market
policy setting. There is a persistent tendency to postpone market-
liberalizing decisions. As will be illustrated shortly, there have been
policy directions away from market-directed solutions. The pro-
longed clinging to price controls and the introduction of regulations
which increased monopoly power of some state and private enter-
prises reduced the role of the market mechanism and introduced
monopolies in the Philippi.ne setting.
If the policies were more market-directed, the economy would
have been able to realize the virtues of encouraging ventures in agri-
culture and in industry which would have been more labor-using.
This certainly would have encouraged a surge of exports based on
comparative advantage during the first and second decade of our
independence. As we all know, by the end of that 'first decade of
independence, capital and entrepreneurship in the country was
already steeply entrenched in industries that were supposedly
replacing imports by consuming, instead of adding to, our scarce
foreign exchange resources.
When Milton Friedman visited Singapore in 1980, he lectured on
the role of free enterprise and the price mechanism in some coun-
tries, including Singapore, as a major factor responsible for their
rapid development. Whereupon the Singaporean economists and pub-
lic officials pounced upon Friedman for his ignorance of the fact that
Singapore's government plays a very strong role in the country's
development policy, as, for instance, in the promotion of forced
saving through the central provident fund and the housing program.
In this exchange, it seemed that what was lost was the 'flavor of the
role of Singapore's economic policy in promoting competitive enter-
prise, which is the basic ingredient of the strong role of private
enterprise in that economy. In essence, Singapore's distinctive policy
with respect to private enterprise is to encourage it by action and by
inducements. Allowing coml_etition and granting no special favors
are principal policies that the government has kept consistently.
Popular analysis of economic success stories of these countries
often cite cultural and political factors in addition to special circum-
stances as dominant explanations. When they run out of argument in
a comparative discussion with the Philippine case, they advance the
level of economic or industrial development as being different, thus
elevating the matter to a reductio ad absurdum. Not too long ago,
these countries were not unlike in any of the initial conditions of
development. When the economic factors are emphasized, the role of
government (especially in the case_of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) as
being supportive of industries through protection is mentioned. Yet,
in the Philippines, government protection of industry has been one
of the most outstanding features of industrial policy promotion. The
professional consensus on this for the last twenty years has been that
protection in fact was too much and needed reform at its very core.
A major reason for the strong competitive challenge emanating
from these countries is to be found in their reliance on market forces
whenever there are economic adjustments to be made. For instance,
government procurement in Japan is avery competitive endeavor. In
industrial promotion, domestic competition is a major market pheno-
menon. So is the competition for export markets, once relative
guidance through MITI is determined. In all these, market forces are
allowed to work more fully in encouraging an environment of com-
petition. This is one reason why the rate of private bankruptcies in
Japan is high even during times of prosperity.
By the same token, Korea adjusted exchange rates of its currency
freely as often as necessary, whenever the international value of the
.won fell out of line with what was considered its competitive value in
relation to export industries. Theirs is an exchange rate policy de-
signed to price their exports cheaply and, in effect, competitively.
This automatically adjusted import prices also by making them,
through the exchange rate, expensive. Their enterprises face uni-
formly competitive pressures in their domestic and international
operations.
Probing the Philippine Economic Malaise
It is useful now to deal more concretely with the Philippine case.
Induced by demand in the U.S. market, the Philippines rapidly ex-
.panded during the colonial period. That period produced an unbal-
anced development which was closely linked to the fortunes of the
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U.S. business cycle. Towards the end of American rule in our coun-
try, the economy was highly geared towards exports.
The country needed to diversify its economic structure. This
included diversifying industries that earned export revenues. It was a
major task of economic policy to develop a 'framework that would
establish the relationship with the U.S. economy on a healthy and
more diverse footing. This meant diversifying exports to other prod-
ucts in addition to, but not in place of, the major primary exports
which already had an entrenched market.
The principal cue was missed. The trade adjustment program
from 1946 to 1974 which included preferential trade with the U.S.
was seen by some policymakers not as an advantage but as one that
promoted a relationship of economic dependence upon the U.S. mar-
ket. It was a setup that favored the continuation of primary export
dependence. So, they decided that there was a need to develop indus-
tries that weaned the economy from the preferential framework as
soon as possible. The preferential trade agreement was seen largely as
a U.S. imperialist design to continue the trade domination of the
country. But whatever may have been the imperialist designs of a
former ruler, the country had enough options to take care of new
directions 'for the future.
The special preferential tariff patterns favored _mports from the
Philippines into the American market. The grand opportunity to
explore new export possibilities presented itself. This would have
meant developing an industrialization strategy basedon comparative
advantage. But the opposite was undertaken. The government,
through the policies of exchange and import controls and protection,
decided to promote import replacing industries instead. This short-
sightedness produced the contrary effect.
The experience of the East Asian NICs (newly industrializing
countries) presented itself as a possible pattern that should have been
'followed. That would hav.ebeen somewhat more painless in the case
of the Philippines. The mechanism for it was available -- the so-called
Bell Trade Agreement and later, the Laurel-Langley Agreement
which revised the former. This was uniquely a Philippine advantage.
Other countries bad no such preferential market to work with, ex-
ce.pt later in the 1960s and 1970s through the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) of the UNCTAD which, compared to the PhililS-
pine preferential trade with the U.S., was a fairly limited form of
concession from which the country also benefited.
The Philippine opportunity was unprecedented. The preferential
trade agreement was with the most prosperous, openly trading, and
largest single economic market. Instead of taking advantage of this
opportunity, Philippine policymakers saw ghosts of the dependent
relationships that were unequal and perceived incorrectly the possi-
bilities offered by the opportunities. Have we ever heard any voice
today which does not blame unequal relations with the U.S. as a
cause, partly, of our underdevelopment? In my view, those who
nourished the policies of controls and import substituting industriali-
zation of the past still decry this pattern.
After independence, a series of grand policy mistakes followed.
These could only be attributed to erroneous perceptions of our
economic problems. Consequently, the years whittled away resources
and natural advantages that were in our hands. Many of our country-
men who tend to blame outside forces for our economic problems
should attempt to review this phase of our economic history and the
arguments put forward to protect the policy choices in those days.
What we tried to do in the early 1970s, i.e., gain as much labor_
intensive industrial expor'ts to the U.S. market as possible was to
move two decades too late into the strategy of trade and develop-
ment that preferential trade arrangement with the U.S. offered. By
then, our neighbors had already preempted a large ground in our
potential markets. Also, the climate for growth of international trade
which was so conducive to the growth of these same neighbors be-
came altogether different and certainly somewhat more restrictive.
These neighbors, the four Asian NICs, accomplished without the
benefit of the same exclusive advantages their early industrialization
patterns which capitalized upon industrial manufactures based on
labor-using exports in the largest economic market -- the U.S. econ-
omy.
The main culprit responsible for failing to perceive the advan-
tages of developing according to comparative advantage was the
movement away from a market-determined, or realistic, exchange
rate policy. This was the critical policy variable for export and trade
realignment. For exchange rate policy impacts strongly and imme-
diately on domestic and foreign prices. Its effects, therefore, are
quick and sharp.
Of course, any missteps could be corrected. The government,
sensing the ill wind that controls brought, dismantled them and freed
the exchange rate. Once-over steps always have the effect of realigm
ing economic forces. The failure of our development policy in this
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regard was to work with a given exchange rate and to support it for a
while even when it had become an overvalued rate.
The corrective action seemed to lag rather than to lead. Even
when the policy was to "float the peso," it was a "dirty" float, as
others have observed. Actual market signals which tended to show
that it was overvalued were ignored. As a result, the buildup of
distortions and other obstacles to de¢elopment cumulated.
After political independence was secured, and specifically when
central banking was introduced in 1949, the monetary and financial
linkage with the world market, specifically with the U.S. economy,
was partly disrupted. The setting up of an independent monetary
system was a necessary act of sovereignty. This is a universal expe-
rience for all newly independent countries. They have to devise their
own institutions in order to develop alternative means of assuring
that normal economic activities are not disrupted. In fact, of course,
independence represents a historical discontinuity that all nations
have to face.
The strength of capital flows which would have emanated for-
merly from the direct and indirect guarantees of American financial
institutions was therefore disrupted. A degree of monetary and
financial isolations was necessarily the price of independence and
of central banking. But central banking policy need not have, been
any more autarkic than before.
For instance, with independence, Singapore devised her financial
relations with the world by having a more open financial system.
This had implications on the way other economic policies had to be
directed. Singapore freed many sectors of economic policy and, al-
though they_adopted financial regulations, their system was an open
international financial system. This system was based on preserving
monetary stability and included a conservative fiscal and monetary
policy.
The route chosen by our central bank was different. It could
have taken advantage of the opportunities of the market, by linking
the peso to its true international value and not pegging it senti-
mentally to its prewar parity with the U.S. dollar. Initially, such
depreciation could have been seen as a weakening of the peso, then.
In the long run, it would have created a stronger Philippine peso
today.
At that crossroad in its history, the economic course of the coun-
try could have been altered. The Philippines could have been further
helped by other auspicious circumstances. These include its relatively
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high level of international reserves at the end of the war, propitious
world trade events, large U.S. military spending for goods and serv-
ices that lasted through the end of the Vietnam War in the early
1970% and other spending notably by American military aid. All
these could have laid the foundations of industrial growth that
instead took place in Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan one de-
cade later -- in the 1960s.
Of course, part of the problem was that, in the early years, like
some 'features of Philippine-American economic relations, we did not
have full monetary autonomy. We could not even touch the value of
the peso without the consent of the American president as provided
'for in the Bell Trade Act. This was, as correctly pointed out by many
observers, an infringement of Philippine sovereignty by a country
that was supposed to be its benefactor. It was clear that such in-
fi+ingement was instigated by the need to fully protect the interest of
the nationals of the former colonial ruling class in the newly inde-
pendent country and constituted a mistrust of [he future course of
development.
As an independent country, we were not short of methods that
enabled us to achieve what we wanted by way of policies. The
independent action of imposing the exchange and import controls to
preserve the value of the peso was one such sovereign act. In fact,
U.S. interests complained to their government about these. And they
presented a vested front whose views were considered by their gov-
ernment within the framework of the negotiations to revise the Bell
Trade Act.
I attach to foreign exchange policy -- the act of delayed adjust-
ments in the value of the peso- the most serious economic policy
error of our independence. In those days, the common wisdom
among economists in the country was that we needed those measures
to conserve resources. In adopting stringent exchange and import
controls, we led ourselves into the domain of the pernicious cousins
of all kinds of price controls that we found ourselves instituting
throughout our independent history and even into tile present.
In attempting to conserve resources, they were practically squan-
dered. These resources were not properly and fully priced through
the market. If government policy had insisted on their proper market
values, the resources would not have been consumed soon enough
either through the mechanism of feeding them as raw materials to
newly promoted industries or simply through outright expenditure
for consumption. Foreign exchange resources were made cheaper,
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through an overvalued exchange rate, or government policy wished
them to remain cheap to feed to preferred users. The result was a
massive misallocation of resources.
Some parties, through their closeness to the powers that be in
government who approved licenses to import, were able to get their
foreign exchange and import allocations rather cheaply. The assem-
bly plants that they built were thought to be the beginnings of a
sound industrialization. But in effect, they were largely fed by raw
materials that were imported. They also borrowed capital very cheap-
ly, at rates which were lower than the scarcity value of capital,
through the development finance institutions set up by government.
Hence, these industries received the highest form of protection
through the control of competing imports and the availment of
cheap credit and foreign exchange. In this sense, they were nurtured
to monopolize a limited market. When the foreign exchange re-
sources became scarce because the trade system was largely con-
suming foreign exchange and not producing it (witness the persistent
balance of payments deficits), these industries became very vulne-
rable. Their raw material base became too expensive or were cut off.
The result was that the same industries floundered and many failed
to survive harsher times.
The cousins of economic controls therefore had their heydey in
the early years of independence, and they have been nurtured up to
the present. As will be shown in the 'following, their early beginnings
and their continued survival in the economic policy package until
today was marked with good intentions.
Good Intentions Behind Government Interventions
Government actions are initiated with good intentions behind
them. This is especially true prior to the adoption of any new policy
before any vested groups get established.
Some undesirable results may accompany a particular policy be-
cause it may be inadequate or misdirected. The policy may actually
end up achieving a result different from what was intended, in this
case, it leads to some effects that are not foreseen.
With respect to the operation of the market, this is how the
patterns arise. First there is dissatisfaction with the resulting situa-
tion in a particular sector. This dissatisfaction sometimes leads to the
joke that the government should repeal the "law of supply and de-
mand." This dissatisfaction is sometimes perceived as an inefficient
or cruel result of certain factors operating in the market. And the
13
presence of monopolies, as well as the inequitable distribution of
benefits, is too obvious in this kind of perception.
On the ground that it is a public duty to improve the setup, the
government sets up its own intervention. This could be in the form
of trying to influence directly the reasonable prices or margins that
private enterprises could be made to comply with. Such prices may
be on goods or on factors of production. They could be price con-
trols or guaranteed buying prices or minimum wages, in the case of
labor, and maximum lending rates, in the case of credit. So long as
the government follows the market in setting these price targets,
things would go all right.
.... In principle, a realistic intervention could lead to good results.
But very often it does not. The temptation is always there to delay
any desirable change. Once controls on prices are established, pres-
sure groups are polarized. At one extreme are those who insist on
maintaining the same policy of delaying any action, or reducing the
extent of any proposed adjustment. And then there are those who
seek alterations in the current pdlicy that adversely affects them. A
market adjustment would be much simpler to attain this. But with
controls in force, the adjustments made are in hidden activities such
as the reduction of the quality of service and the reduction of other
associated costs, such as those in marketing. For instance, marketing
costs could be shifted to the buyers or other enterprises operating in
the distribution system. There can be a shortening, for instance, of
working capital credit. Such hidden adjustments eventually lead to
quality inflation which is not revealed by price regulation.
Wage Policy
When minimum wages were set initially in 1951, the idea was to
raise a working wage to a "normative" level. This level was deter-
mined by Congress. What constitutes a decent working wage is an
important question of public policy. But it is an intractable one. This
measure deflects from the more fundamental and tractable question
of promoting the employment of every one seeking employment in
the labor force. When the initial industrialization set off inthe 1950s
(I hesitate to use the term "took off"), entrepreneurs were led by the
existing policy to choose import replacing activities and 'to shun
export-oriented labor intensive industries. The minimum wage and
cheap credit worked together to favor mechanized operations in
industry rather than the greater use of labor. To some extent the
same attitude was promoted in the modernized sectors of agriculture.
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When tripartite meetings are held by organized labor, employers,
and government, the objective is to come out with an agreed form of
indexed minimum wage package (including allowances, etc.). This
package is in keeping with certain norms determined in timepast (the
working wage). Organized labor and relatively well-to-do employers
in the private sector, who are refereed to some extent by govern-
ment, undertake what looks like a bilateral monopoly bargaining
process on that wage package. In this bargaining, the millions of
unemployed, or those employed in marginal occupations and there-
fore wanting better employment and the thousands of enterprises
that can ill afford to pay any more new wage increases, are excluded
from this process. If the government did all it could to police the
implementation of what it orders in the first place, many more enterr
prises would go under.
As a consequence, a large amount of new unemployment results.
It then becomes far better for government to pretend to implement
laws by justifying and setting up a large bureaucracy, and by expand-
ing the Ministry of Labor and its bureaus. This sometimes allows the
slowdown of the implementation process. Confronted with the
reality of a high unemployment rate, as is true in the country, the
government often finds itself trying to close its eyes and turning deaf
ears to the full and strict implementation of the wage laws. In this
way, a greater disruption in employment is avoided. But there is one
result of this. It breeds contempt for the law and radicalizes all the
more the labor sector -which complains of exploitation. Hence, it
contributes to the breakdown of respect for government and its
policies.
Yet, when the proposed wage package is presented to the presi-
dent of the Philippines for his ultimate approval, much of the bar-
gaining process for wage setting has almost, come to an end. The
approval, which is expected, becomes the apex of a political process.
It elevates an economic issue into the political arena. The president
can disapprove the settlement or return this to the bargaining table.
The course of least resistance is to show tlme concern for a sound
bargaining-process and therefore to approve what is presented as
the bargain. The wage bargaining and indexation, which comes with
the process o'f technical computations by government as part of the
negotiating process, has put the president in some sort of a political
trap. It presents him with predetermined figures that he would have
to approve in the end.
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In short, the economic process of wage-setting has become poli-
ticized. The same politization of prices occurs whenever the govern-
ment steps in and mandates price ceilings and floors, in order to
express a policy adjustment. The experience in this regard is very
unfortunate in the long run. We shall now demonstrate this with
other examples of interventions.
It can be argued that the ill effects of one policy, in this case,
wage policy, can be offset by other policy interventions. The record
of past policies, however, had been to exacerbate the bias of policies
against employment creation, which is the major ill effect of mini-
mum wages. Even today when great strides are being made to do
away with some of the other undesirable aspects of economic policy,
this bias against employment is still a major defect of overall eco-
nomic policy, in Singapore, where a high wage is a major government
policy, a large component of the high wage is captured in the form of
forced savings. The contributions of workers and employers to the
central provident fund have come to about 25% of the gross wage.
But it is another matter to discuss the relative efficiency with which
Singapore has used savings. However, these two aspects of saving and
investment explain the high productivity experienced by this coun-
try.
Interest Rate Policy
Good intentions have kept interest rates under control for many
years. This can be traced in fact to the anti-usury law i_ effect since
the first decade of American colonial rule. As eacly as 1970, 1argued
the need for a fundamental reform in this area so that the rea/
interest rate would always be positive. And it was only towards the
end of my work at the policymaking end that interest rate reforms
finally took hold. It was not persuasive economic argument on our
part which worked. World interest rates soared. The country was
engulfed in a world in which capital-rich countries also raised their
interest rates. The successful economic miracle cases in our region
spearheaded initially by high interest rates added to the validity of
this policy direction. Hence, the only success was in bringing the
discussion to the open.
While the exchange rate sought relatively market-determined
levels, during the period of managed exchange rate float, interest
rates were cheap. The interest rates at which the banking system and
the state financial enterprises could dispense their funds were un-
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realistically low, somet-imes even negative when the inflation rate was
taken into account. Therefore, borrowing from government financial
institutions was an especially lucrative proposition if a project could
be developed.
To obtain loans, therefore, it helped to have government connec-
tions. And the large category of "projects under government behest"
even in the portfolio of these institutions indicates the magnitude of
this problem . Today, these government behest projects are classified
largely as nonperforming assets of these institutions. It will take
enormous write-off ,losses for these institutions to put themselves
back into operation. And in the process, they would need new infu _
sions of government equity.
On the other hand, there was a free commercial paper (money)
market in which interest rates practically floated. The government
control of interest rates led to this highly dualistic setup, which was
the natural result of financial repression in the formal markets.
The waste of domestic capital has cumulated over the years. The
present condition of the state financial institutions that have under-
taken this lending is a testimony to the ill-advised policies of artifi-
cially depressing interest rates in the thought that this would induce
capital formation and produce the kind of enterprises needed by the
nation for economic development. The policy had managed to make
some individuals only richer by borrowing low cost development
loans. It became a joke in the early -1970s (when I was new in
government) that some piggery loans had financed some houses in
Forbes Park. This may be an exaggeration with a grain of truth
somewhere.
Sometimes this waste was manifested not so much in terms of
the enterprises that were set up. The capital and taw material pro-
curements used in running these enterprises and the device of con-
centrating management in the associated companies squeezed money
and capital out of these existing enterprises. Also, the high rates of
return in the money markets channelecl private funds, including
those obtained at love cost from the formal sector, like the
governmental financial institutions. This produced additional for-
tunes for those who had access to the low cost funds. If interest rate
calculations had been more severe, some of these projects would have
been eased out by calculations of viability.
The triumvirate of factor pricing policies which were controlled
by government -,- minimum wages, interest rates, foreign exchange,
and import controls and, later, a managed exchange rate float- was
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therefore undertaken because of good intentions. They were the
result of an activist and compassionate role that government decided
to undertake in handling the pricing matters with respect to various
perceived needs in the main affected sectors. They may have been
devised as short-term policies initially. But they eventually created
monsters for the long term. These are the monsters that the present
and future governments will have to grapple with. Their costs to the
whole nation, as the present crisis is showing, are painful. Any one
who fails to believe this will only have to recall the travails of the
nation in the last few years while our neighbors in the ASEAN
are having an unprecedented surge of growth. And we are embar-
rassingly south of the most progressive countries in East Asia --
Taiwan and South Korea. The problems that wrong policies have
engendered and cumulated over the years cannot be wiped out
overnight.
Marketing interventions in the Food Trades
By the same token, good intentions were initially the reasons for
intervention in food distribution. In the early years of the republi G
government interventions in food marketing took the form of im-
ports of basic commodities. These commodities were put up for sale
at low margins on the domestic market. Among these commodities
were rice, corn and basic consumer items. For almost a decade, the
country was fed with imported sardines and corned beef. These
processed foods became basic consumer staples that could be bought
in the local stores. This way, government marketing organizations,
including those for rice and corn, whittled away precious foreign
exchange and defeated the domestic production incentives in these
wage goods.
It was a step in the right direction when import-oriented price
stabilization policies were redirected towards domestic procurement.
It was, however, a step in the wrong direction when the government,
responding to short-term crises, such as calamities and oil shocks or
exchange rate adjustments, stepped in to institute price controls and
keep them there for a long time. The moment the controls were set
in place, the rigidities of price ceilings in relation to increasing costs
of production began to sap producer flexibility. Since adjustments in
price ceilings were on a periodic basis, producers were placed in
uncertain cost positions. The timing and extent of the adjustments
were not predictable. Hence, when these were finally made, quantum
jumps only fueled inflation.
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When price controls were imposed, they were designed to be
temporary. But the "temporary" in government seems to be much
longer than common people normally expect. Most people move out
of what they conceive to be poor personal policy at the earliest
opportunity. This seems to be the'case even when segments within
government recognize the need to make the necessary adjustments.
Government just takes longer to see its own mistakes. This is pro-
bably one of the norms of governing that can be elevated to the same
level as Parkinson's law. Measures justified as temporary take too
long to correct. Governments try to overlook the urgency of meas-
ures to protect the interests of established vested groups. This might
be a case of trying to wish away the problem. And in the case of
these protective measures of market interventions, the vested
interests come in and thrive.
For instance, price controls are easy for any government to un-
dertake. It costs little in direct budgetary expense. But they bring up
a whole mess which costs private citizens and businesses much more
than is realized. Another pernicious impact is that they temporarily
give some power to government bureaucrats. Sometimes this leads to
opportunities for corruption. The power to raise price ceilings or to
close the stores of "profiteers" gives discretion precisely to those
groups in government that should not be allowed discretion in the
implementation of policy.
Moreover, price controls stifle private initiative. They create a
gap between government and the general public, such as when sellers
cynically tell buyers to purchase their pork from the price stabiliza-
tion council. They unduly induce social tensions among citizens such
as when the decreed controls are out of line with actual prices and
buyers and sellers get heated up quarrelling on the relevance of
government-announced price ceilings. For instance, in long-term rela-
tions, the most difficult social tensions were probably generated
between tenants and landlords in rent-controlled dwellings because
of their intermittent, long-term relations. This leads to the next item.
Rent Control
Good intentions also brought about the policy of "rent control"
for apartment dwellers renting at less than i_300 per month. Rent
control created a strong wedge between dwellings offered 'for rent at
this cutoff level and housing for other relatively poor families. As a
resul h an artificial housing gap mushroomed for middle income
housing; the situation was not as acute before. Another major result
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was the heightening of social tensions in poor neighborhoods be-
tween tenants and owners. Today, there can only be a much larger
housing shortage in the country.
The solution to the rent control that was applied some six years
ago to alleviate the matter was to allow a 10% yearly increase for a
period of five years. Before that, the law provided a complete rent
freeze. This could only temporarily alleviate the situation. Over the
years, investments in low-cost housing were undertaken by pro-
prietors and middle class individuals. These investors in property
included government officials who put their retirement money into
inexpensive housing. The experience in rent control and rising urban
property taxes have jointly created the disincentives to housing in-
vestment of this type. Now, those brave souls who still want to build
apartments for rent specialize in higher rental dwellings so that rent
control levels would not reach them, But will assurances that rent
control will not be imposed again be sufficient to make persons with
extra savings go into this low-rent housing industry? It will take a
long time before people again allowed themselves to be trapped,
Control on Educational Fees
Aside from the regulation of standards, the government has inter-
vened also in trying to directly control the cost of education, espe-
cially at the tertiary level. The first area of direct influence was in
imposing price ceilings on educational supplies. This was intended as
a consumer price control measure. As a result, the quality of school
supplies has been adversely affected. Controls created incentives to
alter the sizes and nature of the paper used in the manufacture of
school supplies. Producers moved into the production of highly var-
ied items of school supplies with much bigger prices. The overall
result was a higher cost of school supplies.
Concern for the reduction of tertiary educational costs led to the
control of tuition fces. The result has been to put an unnecessarily
severe strain on the private higher educational system. This is de-
monstrated by the recent case of the University of the East. This
university's problem arose because of a legal problem stemming from
the provision of salary payments to professors in view of tuition fee
controls imposed by the government. While the entry of the Maha-
rishi group provided a different color to the UE episode, the financial
problems' highlighted by the situation exposed the dangers of tui-
tion fee control in the private educational sectoras business estab-
lishments. The private school sector, especially at the tertiary level,
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has over the years provided a mechanism for absorbing into the
educational sector Filipinos who could not be accommodated by the
publicly-supported higher education system.
Tuition fee controls arose out of the best intentions of well-
meaning individuals who wanted to reduce the cost of education.
Price control here has affected the effectiveness of rendering im-
proved services in education. The quality of teaching suffered and
premises deteriorated. If there were a more rigorous study on the
matter it would show that, overall, there had been a general decline
of services in the educational sector.
The current liberalized regulation now being undertaken to allow
schools to raise their fees could only be a temporary relief. The ideal
situation is to deregulate tuition fees completely while the educa-
tional authorities continue to enforce standards. There is enough
competition in the process to keep tuition fees in check. And there is
enough market differentiation among standards in the different
schools so that quality competition, in the face of cost realities,
continues within the school system. What is important is to maintain
minimum standards.
The tuition fee freeze has provided some sectors, notably the
radical student sector, with an issue to capitalize on. Yet in many
countries where it is customary for public universities to charge par-
tially for the cost of education, tuition fee increases escalate depend-
ing on price and cost changes as perceived by university authorities
without interference from the authorities and also without giving
way to student outcries, boycotts, and barricades.
Trend Towards Monopolization: Public and Semi-public Monopolies
or Near Monopolies
We should now turn to other governmental policies which led to
the monopolization by public and semi-public authorities of some
industries. Of course, the cases of the sugar and coconut industries
are already understandably well discussed. Much debate on the
merits of these agencies and marketing organizations has been made
and there is little need to elaborate. Moreover, new light will
probably be shed when the Batasang Pambansa takes these two
industries to task through public hearings that are being scheduled.
The agencies and marketing organizations that have been established
do not require any prolonged discussion.
There are only two Roints of interest that may be worth taking
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into account on the role of governmental monopolies in these cases.
The first point is accountability. Accountability refers essentially
to making appr6priate records of activities and transactions so that
officials can be rendered responsible for their actions. One could
define accountability here in the "public" sense, but it could simply
be "industry" accountability. If indeed these two monopolies were
set up with the interest of the people at .heart, then they should be
able to satisfy an elementary sense of accountability to their consti-
tuents. It is an elementary rule for any group with a public purpose
to keep a record of their operations, including their resources and
their expenses.
The sense of "public" accountability cannot be dismissed lightly
either because government funds or public resources have been ex-
panded in supporting them. These two monopolies can survive public
criticisms about their operations or problems if they can satisfy the
accountability criterion.
The second point is centralization of the decision-making pro-
cess. Monopolies would be perfect setups if their managements were
error free, that is, [f their judgments were perfect. Any decisions
affecting their operations would be in consonance with the public or
industry welfare in mind, in short, with "accountability" in mind.
But supposing such were not the case? There can also be errors in
judgment because of risk and uncertainty.
When monopolies commit even honest errors, they are cen-
tralized and are therefore very costly. Centralized mistakes are the
worst that can happen to a large industry upon whose livelihood
would depend many traders and products and millions of workers
and their families. It would be far better if there were several inde-
pendent decision-makers whose mistakes cancel each other out. In
this case, the components of the industry concerned would end up
enjoying or suffering what the "average" would have taken.
The theoretical justification for a monopoly is that it enjoys
economies of scale because of a 'falling average cost curve. A mono-
poly arises naturally under this condition since any increase of out-
put or of service is accompanied by afalling average unit production
cost. Further, the activity may affect a large part of the national
welfare (so that some monopoly power could in fact be wielded). In
this case, a public interest viewpoint is involved.
In an imperfect market, such as in a trading situation, in which
some merchants or traders are perceived to be taking too strong a
position and are in fact exercising some monopoly power, the temp-
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tation is for government to substitute "control" of the process for
regulation to insure competition. This is a perennial trap that govern-
ment faces. And certainly the Philippine government has faced this
problem many times before and now.
An Example of Food Marketing Distribution by Government: The
National Food Authority
Another example of a government agency that gradually ex-
panded its control over segments of the 'food industry is the National
Food Authority (NFA). If first started out as the National Grains
Authority (NGA), which was created to intervene in the grains busi-
ness. This was a price stabilization agency designed to ensure that
grain supplies for domestic consumption were assured and to stabi-
lize and improve the incomes of the country's staple grains farmers.
Domestic interventions in the procurement of grains could be jus-
tiffed for reasons of domestic food security. This would require the
buying of grain at the farm level at a guaranteed price. This has the
effect of assuring farmers about their revenues from harvests. At the
national level, this gives to the government effective control of a part
of the year's grains at government warehouses.
In the mid-1970s, the NGA took over the full importing program
for wheat grains. The idea was justified partly to improve the bar-
gaining position in securing wheat supplies from other suppliers
which are oftentimes grains marketing boards controlled by the
government. Hence, it made sense to have the government step in,
even if only to put the weight of government behind g?ains purchases
abroad. There were also other reasons advanced by government. £)ne
was to reduce the trading margins enjoyed by the flour milling indus-
try. With bulk purchases _ssured, it was argued that better bargains
could be struck with the suppliers. The result was that the agency
took over a large part of the grain marketing program from the flour
milling industry.
The NGA took over a goldmine. The wheat trading operation was
much simpler than domestic grains procurement. The activity yielded
trading profits unlike domestic grains procurement. One major im-
pact on the flour milling industry was that one part of their opera-
tion which tended to cushion them against losses in bad times was
taken away from the flour milling industry. This was lost by fiat and
regulation to government.
The reason for the takeover of the wheat trade was to reduce the
price of wheat products via the removal of the middleman and trader
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and via bulk purchasing from suppliers. Did this mean that wheat
products, especially flour-, remained low and stable? The wheat
grains import monopoly did not necessarily wipe out the marketing
gains of middlemen. It transferred part of these marketing gains to
the public sector. These gains redounded to the public weal with the
construction by NGA of a larger network of grain warehouses in
the 1970s. As the agency gained more and more power over the
private sector which it regulated, however, it became the problem
rather than tile solution.
In 1981, the National Grains Authority was converted into a
National Food Authority. Only too conscious that such a broad-
ranging agency was returning the food industries to ever-widening
governmental grip, I did not recommend this action. But it was none-
theless created because the pressures for having a broader network of
control and regulation for the food industries originated from groups
in government who wanted to have a direct influence on food distri-
bution. The NFA powers were so broad-ranging that it was only a
matter of time before the agency would exercise them in order to
regulate the food trade.
Such regulation is disastrous to tile industry and to tile general
consuming public. A letter published in Bus Day on 14 Novem-
ber 1984 will describe better the state of the flour milling and baking
industry. It seems that the letter was written by someone knowledge_
able about the state of the industry. Considering its delicate nature,
it looked pseudonymous, judging by the first paragraph:
To openly disagree with NFA (in a public conference) would mean
a big reduction in their wheat allocation.
Main causes of flour shortages have been traced to NFA's wrong
timing and inefficient schedu}ing of wheat shipments; availing of cheap
but inefficient shipping companies; and importing more soft wheat
which is not needed in the market. The said soft flour is now being
forced on reluctant bakers.
Now, when wheat supply is more than enough, NFA has no more
reason to continue handling flour distribution. NFA should now con-
centrate on its original function as a regulatory body' and take necessary
steps to control the rapid increase in tile price of rice and corn which
NFA seems to have neglected.
IfNFA wants to raise revenues or minimize losses because of in-
efficiency, it must streamline operations, reduce drastically their repre-
sentation expenses, PR expenses, and other non-related expenses. It
must watch closely the spoilage and pilferage of goods in NFA and FTI
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(Food Terminal Inc_) warehouses which have contributed to the big
lossesof NFA and FTI,
Claims made by NFA that 90 percent of members of the Federa-
tion of Filipino BakersAssociation are happy and support the allocation
is not true and grossly exaggerated. Only those bakers who have big
allocations and special privilegesenjoy the system. Most bakersarecom-
plaining,..
NFA must not grab the livelihood of legitimate businessmen.This
is inconsistent with our government policy of saH/ing sikGp and 'free
enterprise.
Tile NFA experience recalls nothing more than what is predict-
able from any highly centralized organization. When a government
agency engaged to control a particular trade also decides to parti-
cipate in that trade, the rules of participation becomes more central-
ized and are builtqn in favor of the regulator-cum-intervenor. The
centralization of procedures and controls, which emanates from a
desire to directly affect many aspects of an operation, oftentimes
degenerates into a disruption of already existing channels of distribu-
tion.
The food trade at the retail level is one of time most decentralized
economic activities, it is more or less competitive. Many practices of
trade developed over the years through customer relations also exist
between suppliers and retailers. These relations are oftentimes linked
through a network of informal credit. The smallest units of retail,
which belong to the self-employed family workers, are the ones that
suffer most when the government takes over a function and disrupts
the system. These small traders lack the resources to deal directly
with the NFA. Yet, because of the centralization of procedures of
securing their flour allocations, for instance, they also lose their cred-
it and access to suppliers.
The Kadiwa Program Analyzed
From the control of food distribution at the wholesale and regu-
latory level, the NFA now has gone to the retail level. To help relieve
the urban consumer from the realities of inflation, the NFA caused
the establishment of small retail outlets at the community level. The
results are time much publicized kadiwa stores, which Are designed to
compete with retailers, lhe ultimate impact is to compete with the
backbone of the community retail store, which is the most labor-
intensive family labor establishment _- the small sari-sari neighbor-
hood store and the medium-sized grocery.
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By setting up the kadiwa, as "part of the distributive network of
the Food Terminal Inc., the NFA hoped to reduce the prices of
prime commodities that enter the common food basket of the con-
sumer. This intervention goes in direct competition with the private
sector. Altl_ough the private sector stores will eventually survive the
competition, it is likely that the kadiwa will not survive it, because
its operation is based on subsidy, and that subsidy is not infinite. The
kadiwas are also observed to be operationally inefficient, unlike pri-
vate retailers.
In order to set up and support the kadiwa stores, the NFA,
through its subsidiary the FTI, had to increase investment for new
buildings and new transport equipment, and to raise its working
capital to hold inventory. In addition, it had to hire additional man-
power. The financial resources (for grains procurement) of the
authority, which was originally designed to oversee the domestic
grains intervention program to assure the country of adequate rice
and corn supply, were also affected by this new expenditure.
The scarce managerial manpower of public authorities could be
diverted to attend to the other problems not germane to regulation
and to direct agency operations. This retail distribution activity com-
petes with the livelihood of the poor end of the food retail distribu-
tion network, the very backbone that the government wishes to help
with its so-called sari//ng sikap program.
The kadiwa stores are state enterprises that compete with private
enterprise. In a sense, they are so unlike the private stores. The small,
privately owned stores are normally filled with stocks of goods for
sale. They use their space relatively well. [ri contrast, the kadiwa
stores have more empty shelves. The fresh food (e.g., vegetables) that
they carry often rot or dry. And the meat they carry (like pork) may
also reach the limits of its freshness. However, some goods, especially
canned food, are cheaper in the kadiwa stores than in private stores.
The above comments are not based on hearsay alone for I have
personally visited some kadiwa stores.
The illusion that kadiwa goods are cheaper is only momentary.
Kadiwa operations reflect on the income and balance sheet state-
ments of the NFA and its subsidiaries. The moment the expenses on
buildings, equipment and personnel are taken into account, certain
losses would inevitably make themselves manifest. Who, then, ulti-
mately pays for the costs of this overhead? Although the NFAwill
deny that there are direct subsidies being paid to finance their opera-
tions; the kadiwa program will be sustained because of the opera-
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tional capability and overhead facilities built by the NFA and the
FTI. This is where, in the final analysis, the subsidy component can
be derived.
The real justification for the kadiwa program is political rather
than economic. On surface, it shows the concern of the government
to bring down directly the prices of basic consumption goods. But
even on this account, the results are not promising. When items do
not appear, in the shelves of the kadiwa stores because of scarcity and
these are available in the other sto_s, who gets the blame from the
people? Naturally, the government.
NFA represents an important example of the growing interven-
tions in businesses that had better be left to the private sector. Here
is an agency which has direct contact with the most common people,
the consumers, in effect, it touches the daily lives of the citizenry
although this may not be realized by many. The food trade is largely
composed of very small firms. These firms represent a large segment
of the general population, most of whom employ only themselves or
family workers. In effect, they compete with the large segment of
the poor population in their business. The NFA became a mammoth
regulatory and competing enterprise to the very sector whose opera-
tions it was supposed to help regulate.
This example of a changing public agency is not an isolated one.
The same examples are repeated in many countries in which well-
meaning efforts are made to intervene in a supposedly significant
trade dealing with basic consumer food essentials. The lessons from
interventions of this type toward general public welfare should be
well known by now. In the 1950s and 1960s, the country also suf-
fered from the misallocation of resources by marketing agencies that
were originally designed to protect the consuming public. The legacy
of these agencies was to create production disincentives in the private
sector. Their overall long-term effect was to make food supplies less
readily available. To some extent, mismanagement even caused the
instability of supplies, thereby leading to contrived scarcities. In the
end, therefore, food prices only rose in the long run. The example of
flour and pan de sal is too current to forget.
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Deviations from Competition and Uniformity: Private Monopolies
There have been cases of exclusive privileges within the private
sector that have no public utility justification. The occurrence of
these cases,however limited, has undermined confidence within the
affected segments of the prival_esector. While they may have been
isolated cases, the fact that they have occurred has given rise to the
charge of double standards: one for special parties and another for
the general public.
Some commentators, including the critical press, have lumped
this under the topic of "cronyism." A large segment of the dead-
weight loss of the Philippine economy can be identified with some
prominent casesthat have been associated with this phenomenon of
"crony capitalism." But the phenomenon extends to a wider set of
persons and entities when put in the context of some geni_ral poli-
cies. The biggest industrial failure, the Marinduque Mining and Indus-
trial Corporation, for instance, could not have qualified under the
category of cronyism. It was a bold industrial venture mistimed with
the energy crisis and the world recession of the 1970s.
The granting of special favors may have been encouraged by the
absolute nature of the decree-making power. When institutional
checks are not fully in place or when there is confidence that such
power could be relied upon when needed, favoritism could spread.
Certain parties close to the ruling class were thus able to manipulate
their advantage at the expense of others.
Such actions have put the leadership at a long-term disadvantage.
Perhaps in retrospect, in the light of what some of the excesses had
brought upon the nation when the economic crisis struck and ex-
posed the problem in the open, such practice could only have been
regretted. They happened because of the tolerant atmosphere in
'favor of the close circles within the ruling group. Such a tolerant
view would not have flourished if there were more institutional
checks that functioned well without exception. But that seemed .to
be the crux of the matter. Institutional checks simply meant that the
proper procedures for getting the relevant agencies of government to
pass on their recommendations before any decision was made were
being followed. This procedure is standard, but exceptions could,
and did, occur. In fact, for special groups, the bypassing of this
essential procedure explains why some expected results did happen.
In these circumstances, the institutional process of advice and coordi_
nation was left with situations of fait accompli.
28
in any government, it is not unusual for any group with special
access to those in political power to promote their own interests.
Normally, however, it would be difficult to cite any evidence of
special favor. Silent patronage is often the most effective norm. The
exercise of patronage, therefore, nee_ not appear in the books of
government. Under the setting of absolute decrees, when these are
not carefully used, th'ere could be lapses that would allow special
discrimination. For instance, some officers of government have to
perform certain tasks that are not in accordance with existing policy.
Only a direct order from a higher authority would enable lower
officials to deviate from standing policy through exception. Some
times these orders take the form of a decree or a letter of instruction.
Some groups in the private sector therefore have legitimate gripes
when they complain about the discriminatory treatment against
them. A government must show fairness to all concerned as a matter
of equity. This is a legal, not an economic, point. A government
which relies more on the impersonal workings of the competitive
market can assure its citizens of fairness by minimizing governmental
interventions, including the giving of direct favor°
Some of these special favors might be simply under the euphe-
mism of "orderly marketing arrangement," as in the case of the
special private company set up as a joint venture o'f a private group
with the Bureau of Animal Industry to have the monopoly of im-
ports for meat 'from Australia and New Zealand. Like the takeover of
the wheat import industry by NGA, this measure transferred private
trading operations to a special group.
[t would be interesting to study how a cigarette paper manufac-
turing venture got exclusive tax free privileges to import cigarette pa_
per, thereby conferring upon it the absolute power to knock off any
competition in the same field. This enterprise reaped enormous pro-
fits in its operation since domestic cigarette manufacturing is a large
industry. It is therefore not strange that on this basis the owners of
this company were able to build a large industrial conglomerate
which, incidentally, collapsed. It would be interesting also to find
out if the same profitable cigarette filter company was among the
bankrupt enterprises in this conglomerate that was taken over by
government through the National Development Company.
Under the excuse of providing cheaper means of educational
communications in the rural areas, a black and white television
manufacturer was given special duty-free import privileges. This
affected the domestic market of the television manufacturers that
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were supposed to receive preferential treatment under the Board of
Investments.
The Ministry of Transportation and Communication should
study the rate structure for an exclusive franchisee, a closed com-
pany, that is in charge of satellite communication transmittals into
the country to determine if such rates of tariff are fair or exorbitant
and if such rate structure affords an inexpensive link of the domestic
telecommunications center with the international satellite telecom-
munications, given the revolutionary technological changes in the
field. Is the country paying too high a bill for satellite_transmitted
telecommunications?
A celebrated case in the Bureau of Customs some years back was
that of a soft drinks bottler, one of the big colas. This company was
given tax free importation privileges for bottles manufactured from a
neighboring country. This was designed to give the cola distributor
some competitive advantage. The bottles that were locally produced
were too expensive and manufactured by a conglomerate cousin of
the other cola-bottler.
Special laws are created to enable private companies to obtain
certain privileges from government on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Under established procedures, these privileges are administered by
specially designated government agencies, such as the Board of In-
vestments and the Tariff Commission. If these agencies are guided by
policies that allow competition and the market system to prevail,
they can tailor the policies so that their actions would promote
rather than reduce competition.
For too long, the proposition that a country like ours cannot
tolerate competing enterprises because of a limited domestic market
has been interpreted to mean allowing few competitors or only a
monopoly. This leads to an undesirable result. It allows unfair ad_
vantage to be derived by a producer over a captive market. The
competitive solution is to allow some degree of tariff protection
while imports are made to compete with domestic manufactures.
The efforts at tariff restructuring are clearly in the direction of im-
proving the setup.
For years, I have argued in favor of this direction, if only to
improve the system of protection and to remove the distortions that
have been found to exist because of unequal protection and the high
cost, poor quality local import substitutes that'our industrialization
program has promoted. This should have been done much more
quickly before the midq970s. But government takes ever so slowly
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to convince and even then only if some offer of a quid, like a big
loan from the World Bank, is available. Doing good for the economy
should not require waiting in general.
But this is water under the bridge. I am glad to some extent that
corrective steps are currently being taken. The only unfortunate
thing is that it gives credence to the charge that the measures were
taken on the goading of external institutions rather than because
they were desirable to begin with, as indeed they were. From my
own viewpoint, their desirability had never been in question.
The element of monopoly privileges is still allowed by govern-
ment to be exercised under the guise of protection. While enormous
incentives are already available to help out enterprises, certain privi-
leges, like requiring tariff certifications prior to importation to ascer-
lkain the availability of domestic substitutes, are given to agencies.
These agencies, in turn, would make a decision based on information
supplied by the affected company as to the availability of adequate
local supplies.
Take the case of the largest paper and newsprint manufacturer.
This company has been given virtual monopoly over the newsprint
market in the country. Time was when our newspapers were among
the best presented in the Asian journalistic market because they were
at least printed on good newsprint. But the government has given this
company virtual monopoly over newsprint production and distribu-
tion. In fact, there was a time when this company was allowed to
import newsprint which, together with its production, controlled the
supply on the domestic market. Newsprint imports are not allowed
at times and their tariff rates are already high. As a result of this, the
local newsprint maker had little incentive to improve the quality of
newsprint. And among ASEAN countries today, the Philippines has
the distinction of having _;he worst newsprint on which our news-
papers and other schnol supplies are printed.
Just recently, the new Philippine cocochemical venture was given
the exclusive privilege to import alkyl benzene, a petrochemical
product used in the production of synthetic detergents. If one had
the patience to review the tariff code, it would be easy to find
provisions of the following kind: a commodity import would be
entitled to a lower rate of tariff if certified by the Board of Invest-
ments.
Ultimately, this procedurally means that the Board of Invest-
ments, with consultations or judgment On its part, would determine
if company X is capable of supplying the competing domestic prod-
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uct. If the producer is persuasive enough, or if a bureaucrat deter-
mines independently that in any case the product is produced local-
ly, the imports could be judged as unnecessary and wasteful, even if
the price is better and the quality more assured. In such cases, it
would really be so much better if actual tariff rates, compensating
taxes, and antidummy duties (if dumping could be proven) could be
applied, given a prevailing exchange rate which is presumably not
overvalued. This is far from the so-called "free trade" solution that
some careless critics on the scene harp on as the main objective of
the tariff restructuring program.
The price mechanism would therefore play its role and nogovern-
merit regulator need ever control the processthrough his signature or
assent. It is monopoly power of the regulator, or as transferred by
this regulator to the private enterprise, which reduces the competitive
urge and therefore penalizes the whole country in the end. When a
company, which is already given generous tax and other investment
incentives, is further given additional control over the life and death
of companies consuming a product that it produces, through privi-
leges granted by the state or its instrumentalities, it creates condi-
tions that make them automatically earn profits even without half-
trying. The instruments of tariff protection or antidummy measures
should be made to fulfill certain tasks. But the power to determine
the fate of other competing users should not be left to them or to
the state bureaucrat. This is the kind of power which is promoted by
the use of tariff certification procedures which those in the private
sector who need imports to sustain part of their operations under-
stand too well.
The Planning and Implementation Processes: Resources and Public
Expenditure Control
Under martial law, the capacity to generate public resources to
pursue government programs improved. Early in the 1970s, organiza-
tional changes in the planning machinery made it easier to streamline
the activities and functions of government. The planning machinery
was strengthened. Compared to previous years, there was greater
coordination of the economic programs. Government corporations
were revitalized and some new ones were created. These changes
were designed to carry the mandate of development more effectively.
The taxable resources of government improved. Changes in the
domestic tax system were made. An enlargement of the tax basewas
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achieved, covering, for instance, a wider field of agriculture, trade,
real property ownership and other hitherto untaxed areas.The basis
for the kind of dedicated, no-nonsense development that had taken
place in such authoritarian governments in East Asia that are now
classified as NICs became available to us.
What went wrong? To some extent, the failures of policy to use
the market more effectively, which is the theme of what has been
said so far, have a big story to tell. But all that is not sufficient. Many
other factors converge together to concoct a kind of "witches
brew" in the emerging saga of Philippine contemporary history.
Shifting priorities, changing expenditure strategies, towering persona-
lities: all of these contributed to this concoction which led to the
results. We shall briefly discuss aspects of this brew by relating it to
the planning and implementing process. In this way, it is possible to
examine the effects of these developments on the nation.
The improved capacity to raise financial resourcesthrough taxes
and other forms of saving was not matched by the same quality of
control over public expenditure and private investment. Among the
important reasonsfor this phenomenon, it is possible to refer to two:
(1) overconfidence, and (2) defects in the economic decision-making
machinery. These points require elaboration.
The government in the early 1970s was in possessionof viable
governmental programs designed to raise the level of public and
private investment. The country built a good credit standing from
external creditors and foreign investors. Public confidence in the
development orientation of the government also grew. Such confi-
dence also emerged somewhat from that unquantifiable variable that
can be associated with the term "political stability."
The initial results of martial law led many to believe that eco-!
nomic discipline and progress would at last follow. In spite of the
oil shocks, the programs designed to improve the overall infra-
structure in transport, agriculture and irrigation, power and industry
continued to dominate the picture. This gavea coherently confident
picture of the way the economy was being managed: government
investments were being made for productive activities. Thus, the
direction of these investment programs exuded confidence among
local business. Among international business concerns seeking op-
portunities of profitable expansion overseas, the Philippines was
becoming an attractive proposition. In such an environment, private
investment grew.
At this point, the country's international credit rating was in
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good standing. Loans for many projects including those in theprivate
sector became much easier to obtain, especially if these were ob-
tained under government guarantee. The public borrowing program
was worked out with the international public agencies, the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and the bilateral public
sources, principally the development assistance institutions of the
United States, Japan, and other friendly countries. These loans were
largely designed to finance projects identified in the Development
Plan. All of these loans were basically prudent and well within the
long-term repayment capacity of a growing economy.
"Overconfidence" breeds further exuberance. One very influen-
tial sector in the government arose to affect the directions of public
spending. This was a sector that propagated the theme that finance is
only money and that money is no problem. Ergo, there must be
concern for beauty and elegance, whatever the cost. As any one will
recognize, that is hardly a theme that could be attributed to the
prime minister or to his co-workers in the economic management
team.
The result of this misdirected activity was the undertaking of
non-productive investments associated with the government, arising
out of competing programs of expenditure that were neither found
directly in the budget nor ever conceived in the development plan.
They utilized government resources, through support of programs
undertaken by public corporations whose funding was raised either
through equity funding by government or through bond financing.
If there is any negative influence on the credit rating of the
country which could be attributed to a factor that could have been
controlled, this is the sector. But this was only under the control of
the leadership. It is this sector that has given the country the image
of extreme profligacy before the world. This image was very hard to
reconcile with the relative poverty of the nation and with the efforts
to finance the development program by supplementation from for-
eign savings. With widespread travels and retinues, elegant celebra-
tions and festivals, high profile, supposedly people-oriented programs
involving expensive public subsidies, the more was seen, the more
was said. And the result was not complementing.on the development
efforts of the nation.
As a result, and not too prematurely, the nation is "gifted" with
an international convention center out of proportion to its need, a
large film palace that is a vain imitation of the Parthenon in Athens,
many specialized hospitals clustered together but designed to cure
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separate organs of the human anatomy. There is a government-
owned university that is nothing but a public embarrassment both
before our people and before the world. This is a university with no
faculty essentially, but which has been endowed with first rate
buildings and the best sports facility. This is the same university
ostensibly established for the common people in a setting that is
supposed to enrich their lives. Now we find the further embarrass-
ment of its premises being used instead to educate the children of the
very rich Filipinos and foreigners in the country under the auspices
of the exclusive, alien-sponsored Brent School. And, of course, this
university was established by the same group trying to preach that
the country's programs must address the 11 basic needs of our
people.
These projects may seem peanut-sized in their direct effect, con-
sidering the total magnitude of government undertakings. But they
have a large indirect impact. One side effect is that they have en-
couraged a culture of extravagance in many ways within government.
When examples are available for the faithful followers, imitation be-
comes a cheap and accessibleart.
These activities must have cost the country a margin of higher
cost in international credit circles. The cost of Philippine debt over
LIBOR in the international finance market, which rose as other fac-
tors made international lending more difficult, might have been part-
ly affected by the high profile extravagance in some sectors of gov-
ernment. The government could not finance large-scaleprojects that
are not even mentioned in the development plan and, at the same
time, plea before international lending institutions for counterpart
peso financing for development projects (which wasgetting difficult
to raise). With the show of ostentation, international lenders did not
give the country a good rating. Hence, they were constrained to
tighten their terms, implying higher risk premiums, for loan syndica-
tions involving the Philippines and its institutions.
Of course, other governments all over the world are guilty of
sustaining aberrations in their expenditure systems. Such aberrations
are obviously justified in some other contexts, for instance, political.
These are the areas that are normally not treaded by the economic
adviser. In any case, they affect the quality of the turf in which the
whole government operates.
Many projects undertaken in the private sector during the 1970s,
especially those that require a large quantum of capital investment as
the later experience revealed, had been of poor quality. It is fair to
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state that some fortunes were made by those who only initiated
projects and procured machinery rather than run enterprises. In some
cases, the viable operation of the enterprise was not a major con-
sideration of the project proponent. This explained part of the prob-
lem within some segments of the private sector, especially those
with access to large loans and guarantees. This is not to condemn the
private sector but to point out that some segment was more in-
terested in the quick profits from procurement. In some cases, it
seemed easier to default on the obligations and leave to the govern-
ment financial institutions the problem of holding the bag.
This was, of course, far from the intentions of the government.
The private projects were supposed to add to the productive capacity
of the private industrial sector so that the economy could be strong-
er. Prime Minister Virata had tried to explain this matter in what
turned out to be a statement too difficult for a re.an of his position
to make, when he appeared about two months ago before the Philip-
pine Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Neglect is too strong a term to use. Overconfidence and mis-
judgment would be more apt in describing the failure to estimate
soon enough the impact of the impending problem. Signs of these
already manifested themselves during the Dewey Dee fiasco in t 981
and 1982. This affair had caused the government to undertake defen-
sive measures that were strong but not strong enough to cure the
large problems that by then had cumulated. One signal that could
have helped but did not was the country's foreign exchange reserves.
They turned out to be much lower than they were reported to be.
The magnitude was large enough - later reports put it at about one
billion US dollars - as to create a self-deluding effect on the quality
of the economic management of the crisis.
If the signals were properly read soon enough, the painful meas-
ures of retrenchments and adjustments would have come sooner, too.
The added presence of salvaging private companies that did not_
manage their affairs correctly actually reduced the fiscal flexibility. I
of the government. Already, the legitimate development projects
in the pipeline had suffered by then.
Disruption of Planning and Coordination
It is now essential to go to the maim point about the disruption
of the economic decision-making function. One effect of the enlarge-
ment of the government machinery and the expansion of the public
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corporate sector is the creation of different centers of coordination.
The ultimate coordination should have been exercised within the
NEDA and the Cabinet. In [he 1970s, as well as today, the normal
institutional controls have already been in place, either by deyelop-
ment or by past tradition. If these controls are relied upon in the
assessment of governmental projects, a greater degree of consultation
and accountability in the government may arise. These are two very
essential attributes that improve the soundness of public under-
takings. But these steps are at the cost of speed in decisiori-making.
At the beginning, coordination was relatively strong.
This 'form of control was weakened as the 1970s rolled on.
Stronger personalities in the government began to gain much more
direct access to higher authority for their pet projects and proposals.
By allowing the bypassing of this institutional network of the govern-
ment, the planning and decision-making machinery, which began
auspiciously early in the decade, was weakened. As a result, many
new institutions were established. Some of these institutions carried
powers and functions which ran counter to some established policies
of the government.
For instance, the most common violations were those that per-
tained to tax exemptions and the power to borrow. Eventually, these
decrees were corrected partially, to conform with fir)ancial'policies.
But the financial sector was only a part of this problem. This was
easier to prevent because the direct costs of tax exemptions to
governmental operations through a drop in revenues or lack of con-
trol of borrowing authority could be forecast more quickly. Hence,
the Ministry of Finance was able to manage some of these problems.
It was harder to monitor the implications of changes in the composi-
tion of cabinet committees designed to review certain problems
especially in cases when the coordination process weakened. This
happened when the lead agency failed to lead or take it upon itself to
work without the others.
Odd as it may seem, such cases often occur. Inevitably, with the
lightning quickness of the decree-proposing sectors, proposals were
not properly sieved through discussion and debate, and a large part
of the work of the major economic officers were taken up in what
could be euphemistically called "firefighting." It is a large misalloca-
tion of time when the major economic officers are fighting fires
rather than managing large issues and strategic problems. Fire-
fighting could be reduced by appropriate coordination.
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Perhaps the absolute decree-making powers had sometimes en_
couraged the bypassing of institutional consultation. Proponents of
new laws can be very impatient and blame "pussyfooting" on the
institutional network of the bureaucracy. It was therefore very
tempting for higher authority, given this pressure, to decide before
s.oundadvice came or wasresorted to.
The result of this was the premature buildup of expenditures by
some government corporations ahead of those that would naturally
have come from the normal investment and expenditure pipeline.
There were casesin which less desirable projects or activities got the
financing ahead of those pinpointed in the development plan. Recog-
nizably, in any government, there are pushes and pulls everywhere.
But when the tugging and pulling are not within sight or control of
the coordinating agencies, there is no effective redress or defense.
Thus, instant approvals for some projects happened. As in westerns,
it became a case of the "fast guns" outshooting the slow ones. The
slow ones fail to get their slice of resources.
The gradual deterioration of basic services in government is
accounted for partly by those factors. In recent years, too many
projects of marginal value had diverted the use of normal budgetary
resources that should have gone to basic governmental ministries,
such as education, public health, and police. These services should
have grown in quality as well as quantity. Over time, the salaries of
government employees have deteriorated in real terms because of
inflation. Workers in those ministries have suffered much more, and
to some extent their salaries have even lagged behind average govern_
mental salaries.
A high point was reached in 1978 when the Ministry of Human
Settlements was created. Eventually, the coordination of the eco-
nomic programs of government became more difficult. Sometimes,
the power @nters gave conflicting commands. In any case, the flow of
budgetary resources moved in a predictable direction: larger budget-/
ary flows were being funneled through this ministry, including the
coordination of some budgetary activities of several ministries, and
of several new corporations that emerged under its wing.
This year marks the first time that we are again importing rice.
The climatic factors of 1984 have played an important part. Destruc-
tive typhoons hit rice growing regions. But more than this is involved.
The rice growing program of the government has suffered from rela-
tive inattention because in the last few years much of the support
and funding for programs has been directed to the programs that
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were pushed under the Ministry of Human Settlements. Since
mid-1981, all of government was talking and channeling resources,
especially in the rural areas, to KKK livelihood programs. Traditional
programs such as rice growing, which received so much impetus from
governmental support before, began to get less attention. In 'fact, the
extension services had been partly affected by the shifting priorities
and programs being developed to support the KKK programs. Even
the NFA, which has been much discussed, was devoting more atten-
tion to new programs like the kadiwa and wheat procurement.
In due time, many analysts will have to turn their attention to
this interesting, and very unfortunate, phase of Philippine economic
history. Those in the field of government and public administration,
with the help of economists, would have a field day analyzing this
topic. The Batasan hearings on the 1984 budget, especially in con-
nection with this ministry, and recent news about some corporations
under it, have brought into the open some interesting activities that
may show only the tip of a large iceberg. Within this ministry is the
conglomeration of the most dispensable public corporations in the
present government. They have cost the nation a considerable sum.
And if liquidated today to save for the future, such liquidation will
still cost the nation more.
Concluding and Further Remarks
Many factors explain the present economic crisis. For us to ad-
dress our present problems correctly, we must face the roots that
caused them.
External circumstances have made the economic performance
less favorable to growth. They were not sufficient to cause a crisis if
strong adjustments were made early enough. Such adjustments could
have made good use of the market mechanism to solve many of the
economic problems. Political factors, such as the assassination of
Senator Aquino and its aftermath, caused a crisis of confidence on a
wide scale.
The basic health of the economy had been eroded by years of
inattention to the most critical problems requiring economic reforms
and by the postponement of policies that would have been helpful.
The active pursuit of unnecessary market interventions and the
monopolization of several critical sectors, rather than competition,
conferred special privileges on certain sectors. This, in turn, helped to
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stifle incentives and contributed no less to the frustrations and ineffi-
ciencies in the private sector.
To'add to these, certain sectors of government followed a parallel
and competing program of expenditure which was wasteful by any
economic standards. This was done by wasting government resources
in projects of little social and economic prbductivity. Competition
with productive investments of this profligate program reduced the
effectiveness of government efforts in several areas. These projects
are highlighted by the architectural wonders that were rushed for
Metropolitan Manila and the world to see.
In addrtion, there _sthe tendency to undertake ill-conceived mass
projects, for instance, in the guise of "livelihood generation," as if
that term were only recently discovered. These projects ignored the
lessons of past failures. Catchy acronyms accompany these projects
so that they could partly be illuminated through high profile public
relations media advertising. In the end, of course, true development
proceeds only when people have improved employment and income
and when they begin to learn self-reliance in a meaningful sense.
The development program which emanated from the planning
sectors of the government had been generally of sound direction.
Because the competing programs of wasteful sectors of government
had edged out some funding for other more productive investment,
the average productivity of government resources 'fell. The effective-
hess of government in increasing economic and social productivity
thus suffered.
The lack of faith in the possibilities of the market is a major
failing of Philippine economic policies in the past. If the market had
been more vigorously relied upon in the years following inde-
pendence, instead of the unfortunate policies of exchange and im-
port controls and the pastiche of patch-up solutions for every eco-
nomic problem that had occurred, it is likely that the Philippine
economy would look very different today. There would be greater
national progress. The cumulation of massive waste of capital in the
economy is similar to having lost a costly war through the partial
destruction of the nation's productive capacity.
Much talk continues on our problems in dealing with external
institutions, like the IMF, concerning the critical economic adjust-
ment that has to be made. This deserves a few pointed direct com-
ments.
First, the substantive problem that we face today amounts to a
large economic crisis. Much of this crisis is of our own making. It is
4O
not that of other external institutions and countries. Their involve-
ment is that they got caught in the web of our problems. The crisis
can' be traced to certain concrete steps undertaken by time nation's
government in responding to challenges. It can also be traced to
historical roots, and Jn this sense the culpability extends to a long
line of decisions.
There was lack of trust in market solutions, which would have
relieved the burden of government in handling intricate problems and
kept the government busy where it mattered - providing basic serv-
ices of' public_investment in social infrastructure, keeping public
health, education, and peace and order. What the government did
was to undertake unnecessary expansion in some sectors. The faith in
market solutions would have encouraged rather than inhibited the
private sector. It would have made the country better developed in
industry, agriculture, _.nd commerce than it is today.
Second, the responsibility of the government is to see to it that
the nation, including the government's total fiscal programs, lived
within its means. This also requires that government entities must be
fully accountable for their actions. We must learn to control total
spending and to have a very responsible fiscal policy. We must make
ministries and government corporations and semi-public monopolies
accountable for their activities. Appropriate fiscal restraint has to
align with financial and monetary prudence. The problem arises
when too much lip service is paid to controlling the excesses of
government spending when, as the public has found out in recent
years, some sectors of government are allowed their merry way in
spending not only on wasteful projects.
Only recently, you might have noticed in the vicinity of the
Quezon Memorial Circle in Quezon City that a new, special hospital
was hurriedly constructed. This is in spite of the overlay of several
government_built hospitals constructed in this area and the 'fact that
the nation is in a deep economic crisis with a hold order on most new
government programs. Incidentally, this area was originally the site
for a government center until these hospitals preempted the space.
This new center is geographically between the heart center and the
lung center. This is the kidney center, the newest of the network of
expensive, specialized service hospitals. I wonder how much subsidy
was allotted by the Budget ministry to this center for 1984.
Even if there were no conditionality attached to the extension of
new loans for the economic adjustment program, the government
needs to demonstrate sincere restraints in spending especially in cases
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where an act can be symbolic and therefore meaningful. The IMF
facility and the restructuring of the external debt which has been
negotiated can only provide some temporary relief. There is need for
sacrifice together with an ultimate strategy that is sound. A great
regard for true economy and economic effectiveness would be
needed in the years to come. Therefore, there should be no room
for wasteful spending.
Nation building has its ups and downs. Temporary setbacks, such
as the present crisis, can give severelessonsfor us. The pitfalls can be
avoided if they are known. Some useful rules may hopefully result
which can save us. An optimistic look at the present conditions
would be to imagine that we have been dealt a wound that, in time,
would teach us an important lesson. After healing, the body can
rebuild again, perhaps with greater vigor.
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